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The Power of International Reserves: the impossible trinity 
becomes possible. 
 
Layal MANSOUR Ph.D Student  
Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully,  
F-69130, France ; Université Lyon 2, Lyon, F-69007, France. 
Abstract  
This aim of the present paper is to measure first, the degree of trilemma indexes: exchange rate 
stability, monetary independence capital account openness while taking into account the 
increase of hording IR ratio over GDP, over External Debt and over Short Term External Debt. 
The evolution of the trilemma indexes shows that countries applying de facto flexible Exchange 
Rate Regime (ERR) take advantage of the IR and become able to adopt a managed ERR that 
consist of achieving the three trilemma indexes simultaneously without renouncing to anyone 
of them. We found that different IR ratio could have different interpretations and different 
directions of monetary policies, where external debt should be taken into consideration in such 
study while using the IR. As for country that is applying a de facto fixed exchange rate regime, 
the IR (different ratio) do not play any role in changing the patter of the Mundell trilemma and 
do not intervene in monetary authority policies. This paper treats as well the normative aspects 
of the trilemma, relating the policy choices to macroeconomic outcomes such as the volatility 
of output growth. We found different results from country to another, while taking different 
ratios of measuring IR, concluding that the impact of IR on the output volatility could change 
due to the level of external debt and adopted exchange rate regime.  
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, International Reserve, External Debts, Impossible Trinity, 
Managed Exchange Rate, Quadrilemma, Output Volatilily. 
 
Mots clés : Politique Monétaire, Réserves Internationales, Dettes externes, l’Impossible 
Trinité, Quadrilemme,  Taux de Change Administré,  Volatilité de la Croissance de 
Production. 
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1. Introduction  
“Exchange rate stability in emerging countries can be considered as an international 
public good because it facilitates the recycling of the savings of the rich and aging population 
of industrialized countries to the economies of the South in search of capital1”. 
The problem of choosing the adequate exchange rate regime for a country is not 
recent, but date for about two centuries. It is after the collapse of the Bretton Wood system 
that this issue becomes familiar, popular and more developed with high interest by most of 
economists in the world.  “ Flexible versus fixed exchange rate dichotomy” were the topic of 
studies of many economists since 1950s, such Friedman (1953)  and Johnson (1969), Atish, 
Gulde, Ostry, Wolf (1997) , Devereux, Engel (1998) where they were analyzing the 
advantages of flexible exchange rate and fixed exchange rate . They share the conclusion that 
fixed exchange rate regime is associated with lower and less inflation rate and lower rate of 
monetary growth, while flexible exchange rate regime is associated with volatility of output 
and employment. Mundell (1960), theorized in his analysis by studying characteristic of 
capital mobility with exchange rate regime. He concluded that when a country adopts capital 
liberalization, the best combination with it would be applying a fixed exchange rate regime in 
order to avoid the influence of the interest rate on the balance of payment. To avoid excessive 
price volatility and to attract foreign capital, these countries seek to anchor their currencies, 
formally or informally, to the dollar or to a basket of foreign currencies. This policy may well 
contribute to economic growth for some time. However, the fixed exchange rate is sustainable 
only if inflation in the country in which the nominal anchor (peg) converges to that prevailing 
in the country where it anchors its currency.  Most often, this condition is not sufficiently 
filled, and the combination of excessive real appreciation and external deficits cause a crisis 
and a sharp adjustment in the exchange rate.  If there is no capital mobility, it would be 
preferable to adopt a floating exchange rate regime, in addition that floating regimes appear to 
offer at least a degree of temporary monetary independence (Frankel, Schmukler, Servén 
2004). Flexible or fixed, monetary authority has to trade-off between two extreme exchange 
rate regimes (corner solutions)  1-totally flexible or 2-totally pegged are related to two main 
objectives: the first objective is to promote price stability (by minimizing variation of the 
output and prices) , and the second objective is related to afford welfare (by maximizing the 
                                                          
1 Jacquet P (1999) in Bergsten F, Davanne O, Jacquet P ; Pour une gestion conjointe de la flexibilité des 
changes ; in F. Bergsten et alli (eds), Architecture financière internationale, Rapport du Conseil d’Analyse 
Economique, n°18, La Documentation Française, Paris, p.9-54. 
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utility function). Whether Fridman (1953), Mundell (1960, 1961, 1963), Aizenman and 
Frankel (1985), Aizenman and Hausmann (2001), defend the first objective, other economists 
such Lapan and Enders (1980), Helpman (1981), Eaton (1985), Chinn and Miller (1998), 
Neumeyer (1998) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) defend the second objective. All together 
agreed that there is no optimal exchange rate regime to be adopted by a country, especially for 
a country vulnerable to chocks. Thus Ripoll (2001) listed several factors that should be taken 
into consideration for each country before adopting any kind of exchange rate regime: the 
importance and the degree of financial openness, the capital mobility of the economy, the 
inflation level, internal and external chocks, capital mobility, prices and wages flexibility 
degree, monetary authority flexibility degree and price system fixation.  
Since the development of the Mundell Fleming “trilemma” in 60s, or the  “impossible 
trinity” that showed that it is impossible for a country to associate simultaneously the 
financial openness with the stability of exchange rate regime and the monetary independence 
(figure 1a) the theory has remained strong. On one side sustainability of the impossible trinity 
was argued by Eichengreen (1996), Calvo and Reinhart (2001), Bordo and Flandreau (2003), 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), Allégret (2007), Aizenman Chinn et Ito in (2008) and Aizenman 
and Glick (2008) and many other economists.  On the other side the robustness of the 
impossible trinity was clear with the real experiences of the emerging countries in the 90s and 
2000s, when they suffered from severe financial crises while they wanted to challenge the 
impossible trinity. Since the current turbulence in the global financial market can be beaten 
with the stability of the current configuration of the trilemma, we are witnessing breach of the 
trilemma configuration. 
With the world globalization, avoiding the financial openness becomes more and more 
difficult, and even impossible for some emerging countries that benefits from a very high 
economic growth and financial growth. Therefore, Emerging Countries (EC), with a very big 
prevention and attention of suffering from financial crisis like they did previously in 90s and 
2000s (Figure 1b), tried to follow the globalization trend and open their financial market 
without renouncing neither to monetary independence nor the exchange rate stability 
especially that this latter is primary.  As explained by Bergsten F, Davanne O, Jacquet P; 
(1999), instability of exchange rate can occur to the availability of the external finance for 
both reasons: the possible loss of credibility of economic policy and the need to serve for 
foreign investors or local investors who fund outside a potentially high risk premium to 
compensate for currency risk increased. In total, the cost of capital and the level of investment 
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could be severely affected in those emerging countries which do not try to limit the volatility 
of their exchange rate.   
Previous experiences with severe financial crisis of Latin America and Asia proved 
that:  crisis of Mexico in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1998, Russia, Brazil and 
Turkey in 2000 are all related to the impossibility to achieve the 3 goals simultaneously 
(figure 1b).  
 
Figure 1 a -The Traditional Mundell Trilemma, known as the impossible Trinity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 b -The Challenge Mundell Trilemma, and Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the “impossible trinity” has become self-evident for most academic 
economists and it shared by politicians and monetary authorities, in practice, most countries 
(emerging countries) may face a challenge to achieve all of the 3 peaks of the Mundell 
triangle or at least countries are shifting their configuration to adapt to new challenges and 
changing economic and global structures as shown in the (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: The evolution of Trilemma indices over time2 
a- The evolution of Trilemma indices in Emerging Market countries 
 
 
b-  The evolution of Trilemma indices in developing countries (emerging /not emerging) 
 
 
How can EC achieve these goals that are known impossible? The “degree of 
flexibility” of the exchange rate was mainly created to complete/challenge the Mundell 
triangle, know as well as Mundell Trilemma or Impossible trinity. With numerous and 
different crisis affecting the economy, the issue of possible existence of new configurations of 
international financial system (Allegret 2000,2005) and a “degree of flexibility” (Frankel 
(1999, 2004), Aizenman et al (2008), Popper, Mandnilaras, Obsfeld, Shambough (2011), 
were discussed nowadays. 
According to Devereux et al (2003) and Obsfelt (2006), flexible exchange rate regime is 
always desired by countries, except for dollarized country, where flexible exchange rate (even 
if it is desired) is difficult to be adoptable without leading to a financial crisis (Mishkin and 
                                                          
2 Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2010) 
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Savastano 2001). Therefore, a degree of flexibility would be preferable, and should be 
determined according to the developed level of each country, Rogoff (2004).  In practice, 
most of emerging countries, Latin America Countries and Asian countries are adopting the 
managed exchange rate regime: a floating exchange rate regime with frequent officials 
interventions and theses interventions are due to hoarding International Reserves. 
Here comes one of the important roles of hoarding IR, in addition of the main role of 
International Reserves that provide an effective cushion against external shocks (Annex 1-
figure 1) , it also may let a country to open its financial market with some degree of exchange 
rate stability and monetary independence. The IR will let monetary authority to be able to 
intervene implicitly in the financial market, by manipulating the IR from time to time in order 
to control the financial market.  That’s why it is called managed floating exchange rate 
regime. (Not totally pegged, not totally free capital mobility, not totally monetary 
independence). Thus, the degree of adopting every policy “becomes a variable”, where a 
country can increase its first monetary objective by decreasing other monetary objective or 
decreasing the weighted average of the other policies. 
In many studies of Aizenman (2008, 2011, 2012), Obsfeld (2004) and Ortiz and 
Rodriguez (2002), they showed the relation between hoarding IR and the choice of the 
trilemma objectives. But what is “innovative” and advanced to mention, is that the IR “may” 
be added as a fourth objective, because experiences showed that “no 3 without 4”. This was 
one of the main topic for many economists such Aizenman, Popper, Mandnilaras, Obsfeld, 
Shambough and other; thus, “the impossible becomes possible and the triangle of three 
policies becomes a diamond chart with four policies. 
If above explanations seem to be simple, the practice shows that it is not, and even 
complicated.  
Before trying to represent the NEW configuration of the Mundell triangle, we must address 
several problems such as the adequate level of hoarding IR and the cost of hoarding IR: 
 
*Adequacy level of International Reserves and the Cost of Hoarding IR. 
Ideally, decisions on reserves should be governed by an analysis weighting the benefits of 
reserves against cost, but in practice, there is a huge uncertainty about both the utility and cost 
function that would inform such analysis. 
  
 
 
The Power of International Reserves : the Impossible trinity becomes possible  
 
7 
 
*The adequate level of hoarding IR 
The optimal level of IR were discussed many years ago, with Frenkel and Jovanovic 
(1981) and Ben Brassat and Gottlieb (1992) since hoarding IR practice started; but the rapid 
increase of the IR that have reached more than six fold in the past decade raises the question 
whether this accumulation is excessive or not, thus witness further mathematics and macro-
econometrics studies on this field. In addition, taking into account the cost of hoarding IR 
open the discussion on what is called the adequate level of International Reserves. According 
to the IMF balance of payment manual, the adequacy of reserves is assessed by their capacity 
to prevent or mitigate external shocks (figure 2c). 
 
Figure 2 c- Change in Reserves during the Crisis  
 
 
General measurement of IR are calculated by dividing the IR on GDP. This latter is 
considered such having little theoretical or empirical backing; probably best used simply as a 
scaling factor for cross-country analysis. IMF study entitled Assessing Reserve Adequacy 
were focused on the IR level and the adequate IR level, by proposing ratio and examining 
them empirically. Unlike Aizenman et al who used IR on GDP in their several/all studies, 
IMF discussion concerning the adequate level of IR suggest to calculate IR on Total External 
Debt and/or Short Term External Debt (STED) or Import or even on M2; especially after the 
Korean crisis 1997.  In 1999, Pablo Guidotti and Alan Greenspan propose the Guidotti-
Grenspan Rule (GGR). This period was marked by “sudden stop” cases, where finance by 
external currency was not so evident (Calvo and Reinhart 2000).  
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He started his idea by saying that a country could be able to pay interest on its external 
debt, but will not be able to repay a principal balance that it had expected to roll on. That is 
why the Guidotti-Grenspan Rule is based particularly on the level of IR that countries should 
possess in order to cover full amortization for up to one year without access to foreign credit.  
This latter is not far from the suggestion of Keynes when he talked about the accepted 
principles governing the optimal level of free gold reserves, in its second volume of his 
treatise on money (1930)3. The GGR was hold up in practice by many econometric and 
theoretical studies such by the regression done by Aizenman and Marion (2004) about the IR 
and it growth trend in the East Asian countries, since the Asian crisis. In fact regression test 
were linked to the theoretical model of the auto-insurance against sudden strop. Econometric 
results talked about mechanism through which no crisis have influenced subsequent reserve 
holding. 
Jeanne and Ranciere (2009), and Jeanne (2007) have estimated the level of optimal IR 
in a model that serves of role of letting national consumption smoothing in the face of random 
sudden stops. Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2009) focus on potential sudden strops as a 
motivation of reserve demand. Consistent with Summer’s observations (2006), countries that 
hoard excessive IR relatively to the Guidotti-Grennspan Benshmark, in some cases, they 
multiply their short term external debt. In fact, External debt arguments for reserve holdings 
emphasize that a negative (capital flow) balance of payment shock can emanate from the 
financial account when the export of home assets to foreigners suddenly stops. (Similar 
shocks can occur when foreign assets by domestic residents suddenly starts). 
In an IMF survey in 2011 entitled “Assessing the Need for Foreign Currency 
Reserves’, the “rules of thumb” that have been used to guide reserve adequacy and suggesting 
that countries should hold reserves covering 100 percent of short-term debt or the equivalent 
of 3 months’ worth of imports becomes nowadays not applicable. In fact, despite their appeal 
in terms of simplicity and transparency, in practice and in 2009, median reserve coverage 
ratios considerably exceeded these norms in emerging markets, standing at about six months 
of imports, and 200 percent of short-term debt. Other paper of IMF 2011, entitled optimal 
precautionary reserves for low income countries: a cost-benefit analysis who focus their 
analysis on cost-benefit approach in low income study didn’t find same conclusion. In fact, 
they found that rule of thumb gives imprecise benchmarks, IR could find solution to 
vulnerability in short term only. If solution at long run is searched, policy should rather focus 
                                                          
3 in Obsfeld & al 2008 
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on strengthening policy frameworks, increasing exchange rate flexibility and diversifying 
economies. 
Some economists such Arize and Malindretos 2012, (and Dutta (1964), Kantie (1972) 
and Pani (1977) )4 look at the consequence of increasing IR  beyond the opportunity of the IR 
such as maintaining the exchange rate stability. Consequence of hoarding International 
Reserves was examined by empirical study in Asian countries. They find that the increase of 
IR may have a positive effect on the demand for import. The source of the IR has been export 
earning remittances of Asians residing abroad, and in few cases, foreign assistance.  As a 
consequence, import of Asian countries such India, Korea, Singapore and Thailand from 1973 
to 2010, import grew at a higher rate to achieving 20% yearly for some countries. 
In fact, the higher is the level of foreign exchange reserves, the less is the policy 
restrictive. With regard to international trade, IR (foreign currency) is often an indispensable 
requirement to finance imports of goods and services. That is, IR plays a paradox role, 
negative role by encouraging import. Given the importance of Import and the positive relation 
with hoarding IR, Import level couldn’t be negligible anymore, therefore, it is important to 
note that several studies included the IMF studies consider that the adequate level of hoarding 
IR is measure by dividing the IR on the Import level: the IR to Import ratio. This ratio 
remains relevant as it can measure in a simple way the level of reserves by the size and 
openness of the economy. The main interpretation of the reserve on month import ratio is that 
it shows the number of months a country can continue to support its current level of imports if 
all other inflows or outflows stop.  The measurement of this ratio focuses on the current 
account, and could be used in general for country that need reserves and limited access and 
vulnerabilities to capital markets.  It should be notes that import data generally suffer from 
relatively few measurement problems which makes the indicator generally less suitable for 
analyzing vulnerability in industrialized countries. For countries with limited access to capital 
markets, the variability of the current account is also important, as reserves are then needed to 
buffer the impact of shocks to the current account. 
According to Obsfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2008), Reserve adequacy should be 
calculated on M2 (broad money) and that M2 has greater explanatory power than other 
traditional factors such GDP. As for the  IMF, IR/GDP is less based as an indicator, but in a 
context where capital account crisis where we witness outflows of deposit of domestic 
                                                          
4 In Arize and Malindretos 2012 
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resident,  IR/M2 may be useful to detect risk of capital flight and can be considered as a 
counter indicator of some crisis.  
Recently, Obsfeld et al (2009) mentioned that despite the focus on the “Guidotti- 
Greenspan” rule and sudden stops in the literature, short term external debt is not a significant 
predictor of reserve holdings, though another variable often considered in more traditional 
models, the Trade/GDP ratio is. Briefly, either the first or the second ratio, the inclusion of 
Trade Balance and external debt should be considered. 
Finally, Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2012) explored the optimality of IR and 
found that generally countries are not exceeding their accumulation of IR; policymakers are 
taking into account their proper economic context such currency denomination mismatch and 
current account deficit.  
 
*The Cost of International Reserves 
It is evident that Reserve have been important in both preventing crises and mitigating 
their impact (figure 3) but they are costly (at both the national and global level) and subject to 
weakening profits. Therefore, once the reserves increase beyond adequate levels, it becomes 
very important to focus relatively more on the other elements of sovereign risk management 
frameworks, such contingent financing mechanisms and country insurance, and general 
macroeconomic and prudential policies. That is why decisions about hoarding IR should be 
governed by a weighted the benefit against the cost of hoarding IR. 
In fact as cited in the European Central Bank5, a continued reserve accumulation may 
lead over time to some risks and cost such as inflationary pressures, over investment and asset 
bubble. As well as for Ortiz and Rodriguez (2002), as continued “over” accumulation of IR 
may lead to strange demands on a Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves especially in a 
context of risky financially open economy, where potential currency mismatches and a 
combination of internal drains (runs from bank deposits to currency) and external drains 
(flight to foreign currency or banks) exist. In the empirically prevalent scenarios of “twin” 
internal and external drains (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999), reserve backing falls when the 
central bank attempts to ease domestic illiquidity by acting as a lender of last resort (LLR). 
Yeyati (2008) discussed about the cost of hoarding International Reserves as well as Bird and 
Rajan (2003) and Rodrik (2006), they suggest that instead of protecting themselves by 
hoarding IR, EMC would rather attack the sources of the vulnerability directly. Popper et al 
                                                          
5 European Central Bank, 2006, The accumulation of foreign reserves; occasional paper series, N° 43. 
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(2011) conclude that the policy stability procured by hoarding IR is limited to -only- low 
income countries, but not in middle income or high income level. According to Cook and 
Yetman (2012) who confirmed the importance of hoarding IR in avoiding or mitigating 
financial crisis (during stress/crisis times and not in normal times), addresses how negative on 
the long run prospect for the economy could be holding a large stock of foreign reserves even 
if the inflationary effects of the reserves are fully sterilized. It could distorted central balance 
sheet, and private sector’s balance sheet. It also may have negative effect on bank lending and 
investment. 
 
In this article, we represent graphically changes in degree for achieving simultaneously three 
objectives of the Mundell triangle as well as the diamond chart while including the IR and we 
represent the extent in divergence in all three trilemma policies. Unlike Aizenman & al (2008) 
who used IR/GDP in their analysis and calculations, we introduce ration of IR/ED and 
IR/STED in order to compare results and to conclude whether ED or STED change obviously 
results. We conclude the article by examining the impact of the trilemma policy and its 
interaction with the level of Reserve (IR/GDP, IR/STED and IR.ED) on the Output volatility. 
Countries chosen: Lebanon, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, are not necessarily 
identical in terms of growth, development, inflations, or other, but similar in terms of highly 
hoarding International Reserves, suffering from a high level of External debt and witnessed a 
turning point in their monetary economy. Because Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are 
emerging countries and experienced similar business cycles and specially have suffered from 
debt crisis and economic events such in 1982, 1997 and 2001,  in addition of hoarding IR and 
suffering from external debt, these countries will be considered in our study as a sub-sample 
group of countries. Lebanon will be studied alone, due to its particularity in terms of crisis, 
and one unique major economic event that is described below. 
 
2. Empirical method 
Obsfeld Schaubaugh, Taylor (2004) studied the robustness of the Mundell trilemma 
through the interest rate, and the latter confirmed that the Mundell trilemma is the guide of 
politic structures, and Glick (2010) studied the relation between capital control and future 
crisis. Rare are economists who changed the configuration of the Mundell Felming model, 
such Ortiz and Roeriguez (2002) who extended the model by introducing the fiscal deficit and 
IR as determinants of the level of country risk, and Aizenman (2008-2010) by introducing the 
IR as a 4th objective leading the monetary authority to achieve at the same time the 3 
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“impossible” goals.  Our study refers to Aizenman study because it introduces in a very 
explicit way the IR and its relation with the three goals of Mundell fleming model 
simultaneously during years and not only the relation between the IR and one goal of the 
triangle. In addition, most of all recent studies on this topic are based on Aizenman (2008-
2010). Thus, we construct for each country a vector of the trilemma and the IR configuration 
in order to measure the Monetary Independence (MI), the Stability of the Exchange Rate 
regime (ERS), the financial openness (KAOP) and the IR. As mentioned above, increasing 
one variable of the Trilemma policy will be followed with a decrease of the weighted average 
of the two others: thus, the “trade off” in the objective’s choice. This tradeoff is considered as 
linear, in other term, the weighted average sum of the three variables is equal to a constant.  
The monetary independence (MI) is based on the correlation of a country’s interest 
rates with the base country’s interest rate. To measure the index of the exchange rate stability 
(ERS), we consider the invert of exchange rate volatility, i.e., standard deviation of the 
monthly rate depreciation, using the exchange rate between the home and the base economies. 
As for measuring the degree of the financial integration, we will take the Capital Control 
index (KAOPEN) of the study of Chinn-Ito (2006, 2008). The constructive way of these 
indexes has been applied and extended to several studies, including Hutchison, Sengupta and 
Singh (2010), Cortuk and Singh (2011), and Popper, Mandalaras, and Bird (2011). 
Once indexes are constructed, we do an index of divergence of the three trilemma policy 
choices and evaluate its patterns in recent decades. All measures are normalized between 0 
and 1. We use the Trilemma indexes by measuring the: MI (Monetary Independence), the 
ERS (Exchange Rate Stability) and the KAOPEN (financial openness, financial integration)  
 
2.1 The MI (Monetary Independence)  
will be calculated in the following way: 
MI= 1-
( , ) ( 1)
1 ( 1)
corr ii ij  
 
 
 i= domestic country and j= based country6. 
Value [0, 1]   if value 1, there is important monetary independence. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Based countries are refered to study of Shambough 2004. 
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2.2 The ERS (Exchange Rate Stability)  
Should the ERS indicator variable be classified by its de jure or de facto status (Ghosh 
é al, 1997)? A country’s actual exchange rate regime choice usually departs from its self-
reported status, as published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and code de la 
monnaie. The preferred approach is therefore to examine what countries do, not what they say 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995; Calvo and Reinhart 2001, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
2002; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004). 
The ERS is calculated as the annual standard deviation of the monthly exchange rate 
between the domestic country and base country. They are calculated and are included in the 
following formula in order to normalize the index between 0 and 1.  
ERS= 
0.01
0.01 ( (log( _ )))stdev exch rate 
 
This formula can suffer from bias in the index and can give us a devaluated or 
revaluated the flexibility of the exchange rate. Therefore, according to the literature, we apply 
a threshold to the exchange rate movement. Thus, if the rate of monthly change stayed within 
+/-0.33 % bands, we consider the exchange rate is “fixed” and assign the value of one for the 
ERS index. 
In fact then +/- 0.33 % bands is based on the +/- 2% based on the annual rate, that is 
often used in the literature.  As well if the exchange rate had percentage change of zero in 
eleven out of twelve months, it is considered as peg, as so we avoid breaks in the peg status 
due to one-time realignments. 
Higher values of the ERS index indicate more stable movement of the exchange rate 
against the currency of the base country. 
 
2.3 KAOP: Capital openness, Financial Openness/ Integration 
It is very difficult to measure the extent of capital account control. Several economists such  
Edison et Warnock (2001), Edwards(2001), Edison et al (2002), Kose et al (2006) et Chinn et 
Ito (2008) were interested in measuring the financial openness in different ways  by 
measuring the capital restriction. Following the model of Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008) by 
calculating the KAOP based on information’s about restriction of financial integration. 
AREAER« Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions of the IMF. 
The KAOP is the first standardized principal component of the variable that indicate the 
presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transaction, on capital 
account transactions and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (chin and Ito 
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2008). It is important to distinguish between de jure and de facto index of capital openness. 
As long as the de jure index indicates the intention of the monetary authority, we chose 
de jure whether than de facto, because this latter can be more susceptible to other 
macroeconomic effects than solely policy decisions with respect to capital controls. 
The index is normalized between 0 and 1. The closer to 1 is the value; the more open to cross-
border capital transactions is the country. 
Starting with Chinn and Ito (Journal of development Economics, 2006), they introduced an 
index that measures country’s degree of capital account openness: the Chinn-Ito index 
(KAOP). This latter is based on the binary dummy variable that codifies the tabulation of 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Reports on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Data are given for 182 countries from 1970 to 2011 and are available online7. Trilemma 
Indices are represented in Annexes, figure 2 & 3. 
 
2.4 Trilemma Indexes and Linear Relationships. 
Previous analyses about macroeconomic policy could be useful to see the evolution of 
international macroeconomic policy orientation, but could not show whether these three goals 
are compact with the impossible trinity, but it is essential to prove that countries have faced a 
trade-off based on trilemma. Thus, as cited above, if the three trilemma variable could not be 
achievable simultaneously, that means that increasing in one trilemma variable may reduce 
the second variable trilemma or the third or the combination of the two others. Therefore, to 
test the validity of the simplest possible trilemma specification, we conduct the linear tradeoff 
analysis. This linear tradeoff analysis measures if the weighted sum of the three trilemma 
policy variables is equal to a constant (two) which explains for example that a higher financial 
integration will be followed by a lower exchange rate stability and a lower monetary 
independence or a combination of these two policy adjustments. 
Consider the following linear regression:  
CST= aj MIi,t + bj ERSi,t + cj KAOPENi,t +εt   
Where j represents country (Lebanon) or subsample groups of countries (Turkey, 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico).  In our example we use a constant equal to two, omitted on the 
right hand side of the estimation equation. Result and Interpretations will be discussed below. 
 
                                                          
7 http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/trilemma_indexes.htm 
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2.5 From the Trilemma to the Quadrilemma 
While describing the role or the advantage of the IR, we assert on a point that IR 
allows policymaker to be more flexible in dealing with the short-run tradeoffs between 
monetary Independence and exchange rate stability, where financial integration is a given. We 
examine the regression including IR ratio on GDP, STED and ED in order to conclude the 
role of IR in achieving certain policy goals. These four dimensions constitute the four policy 
goals, represented in the diamond chart. In each diamond chart for each country or group of 
country, the origin is normalized so as to represent zero monetary independence, pure float, 
zero IR and financial autarky. We repeat the same equation of the linearity between the three 
indexes but this time with including the international Reserves over GDP, over External Debt 
and over STED. Therefore the linear regression that shows whether countries chosen were 
really doing a tradeoff between the three macroeconomics policy goals is:  
2= aj MIi,t + bj ERSi,t + cj KAOPENi,t + dj IR + εt  (j = country or group of countries).  
 Where IR is either  IR/GDP or IR/ED or IR/STED 
 
2.6 The impact of the External Debt and the Short Term External Debt on final policy 
goals 
We examine the impact of the trilemma policy and its interaction with the level of 
reserves on one of the main policy goals: the Output volatility  
Consider the following regression: 
yit = α0 + α1 TRIit + α2 IRit + α3(TRIit*IRit)+ Xit B + Zt Γ+ εit  
yit  is the measure for macro policy performance for country i in year t; , yit  is the output 
volatility measured as a five year standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita 
real output. 
*TRIit is a vector of any two of the trilemma indexes: MI, ERS and KAOPEN, and because 
we have shown that that the three measures of the trilemma are linearly related, it is most 
reasonable to include two of the indexes concurrently, not just individually nor all three 
collectively. 
*IRit is the level of International Reserves (excluding gold) as ration of GDP, or STED or ED. 
Reserves level changes can potentially tell us something about how reserves are being used in 
practice to soften the trilemma tradeoff, particularly between exchange rate stability and 
monetary policy independence. 
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*TRIit * IRit is an interaction term between the trilemma index and the level of international 
reserves. Analyzing the effect of interaction term is very important because we suspect 
that IR may complement or substitute for other policy stances. 
Xit is a vector of macroeconomic control variables that include the variables most used in the 
literature:  
*Trade openness ((EX + IM)/GDP): volatility in world good through trade openness may 
increase output volatility, according to Rodrik  and Easterly (1998)8 and Islam and Stiglitz 
(2001)9. 
*Relative income (to the U.S - per capita real income): there is a negative relation between the 
relative income and the output volatility, in fact it is the higher the level of income is (relative 
to USA 
*M2 growth volatility (yearly standard deviations of M2 growth);  
*Private credit creation as a ratio to GDP as a measure of financial development: as a measure 
of financial development: countries with more developed financial markets may suffer less 
from output volatility according to Aghion et al (1999), and Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2001). In fact an economy with more developed financial market is able to mitigate output 
volatility, maybe by allocating in a better way the capital. In or regression in Lebanon, the 
Private Credit to private sector is not taken because of data are given only from 1990. 
*Inflation rate  
*Inflation volatility as a five-year average of the yearly rate of inflation. 
Zt  is a vector of global shocks that includes:  
*Change in US interest rate: the bigger change occurs on US real Interest rate, the higher 
output volatility may become on emerging countries or less developed countries because the 
US interest rate may indicate that the debt payment problem on these countries.  
*World output gap a 
*Relative oil price shocks (measured as the log of the ratio oil price index to the world CPI).  
The higher the shock is, the higher the output volatility countries experience. 
This equation will allow us to compare two different ways of thinking about the impact of 
reserves and their interaction with the trilemma policy configuration, in affecting 
macroeconomic outcomes. Result and Interpretations are developed later. 
 
                                                          
8 In Aizenman & al (2008) 
9 idem 
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3. Data 
All data are given quarterly by IFS-IMF and completed by the Central Bank of each 
country if needed.  Yearly data are given by the World Bank. 
Like Aizenman, Chin, Ito (2008, 2010), we use cross-country data and time-averages 
of annual data, so that their major source of variation is across countries. Except for Lebanon 
where we use data as a single country. Therefore, the data is higher frequency, being 
quarterly, and subject therefore to substantial time variation. Our period samples are divided 
into sub-period before and after crisis or big economic event. 
We studied the subsample group for the full sample period: 1973 to 2010, as well as 
the subsample period that are divided by major economic event and crisis, such as the 
Mexican debt crisis in 1982, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, and the Bubble crisis in 2001 that 
has affected developed and developing countries, combined with the Turkey debt crisis, and 
Argentina and Brazil Forex crisis.10 
As for Lebanon, we are using a time series for a single country to estimate the 
trilemma configuration, and the period under consideration was a primordial change in 
external conditions as well as shifts in policy stances.  
In a working paper (2006) entitled Identifying Structural Breaks in the Lebanese 
Economy11 1970-2003: An Application of the Zivot and Andrews Test they found that 
structural breaks are identified in 1975 (beginning of the civil war), 1982 (Israeli invasion of 
Beirut) and 1988-1989 (Currency depreciation) and they don’t identify any structural break 
after 90s. In our study we divide the entire sample period into two sub-periods: from 1973 to 
1993 were the economy were suffering from instability due to a continuous was, and from 
1994 to 2010 were the Lebanese economy recognized officially peace and new strategy. The 
Lebanese Government adopt a stabilization economic program (Sheikh S, 2006).  
Thus we consider that Lebanon has only one structural break in 1993, where it was a 
click in the Lebanese in the last two decades. In this year, a new governor of the Central Bank 
was denominated and has adopted de facto a very fixed exchange rate, while the exchange 
rate were flexible, even during the 17  previous years of war (figure 3a). The Lebanese local 
currency became totally fixed. As shown in the Figure 3b in 1993, ERS becomes totally 
                                                          
10 Aizenman, Chin, Ito (2008) invstigated the structural breacks of indexes and found that 1973, 1982, 1997-98, 
and 2001 are candidate structural breaks and are due to major event such as breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1973, the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 (indicating the beginning of 1980’s debt crises of developing 
countries), and the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 (the onset of sudden stop crises affecting high performing Asian 
economies (HPAEs), Russia and other emerging countries 
11 Harvie C, Pahlavani M, Saleh A S; 2006. 
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pegged to the American dollar and index = 1 and KO started to have an opposite trend 
decreasing from 1 to 0.6 over years from 1995: when ERS increases, KO decreases. 
Therefore, in our regressions, we apply a dynamic panel for all studied countries except for 
Lebanon where we apply a simple regression. 
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Figure 3 a: The exchange rate regime of Lebanon over years. 
 
 
Figure 3b - The evolution of the Lebanese Trilemma Indices over years 
 
 
4. Results and Interpretations 
This part discuss the results obtained from our analysis and its statistical 
interpretations of 1- Trilemma analysis of countries chosen, 2- quadrilemma analysis, 3- The 
Impact of (short term) external debt on output volatility of the economy. 
 
4.1 The Linear relation of the Trilemma analysis 
We estimated the triangle configuration by regressing a constant on the three indices. 
The results of difference in policies across different segment of year from 1973 to 2010 are 
reported in table 1 and table 2 at Annexes. The contributions reported in table 1 and 2 , are 
calculated by multiplying the coefficient by the mean for each subsample. 
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4.1.1 The trilemma analysis of Lebanon 
In the case of Lebanon, coefficients are not always estimated with great precision as 
Monetary Independence is not significant. But the overall fit extremely good, Capital 
Openness and Exchange Rate Regime are significant. In the same table, we have the Means 
reported. According to these measures, we can notice that before 1993, Capital Openness 
were the main interest policy in Lebanon before 1993. Since 1994, ERS becomes obvious, 
and adopting the fixed exchange rate de facto is clear. The mean of ERS increase from 0.2 to 
0.99, thus we witness a whole change in the triangle Mundell like shown in Figure 4a. The 
contributions reported in table 1, are calculated by multiplying the coefficient (of the 
regression) by the mean for each subsample. Their sum is almost equal to 2 (all are above 1.9) 
showing the strength of our result. Contributions can give some indications about the policy 
stance such:  
- Capital Openness received high policy weight from 1973 till 1993 while it becomes 
almost neglected after 1993. The ERS that was underestimated before 1993 (-0.01411), 
becomes the main policy with the highest policy weight (1.8326) after 1993. 
 
Figure 4a- The Linear Relation:  Mundell Triangle of Lebanon 
 
 
The Mundel triangle of Lebanon does not seem to be strange, it is predictable because 
we were expecting a change in the whole configuration of the Mundell triangle after 1993 
since the new Lebanese Central Bank policy of fixing exchange rate without any fluctuation. 
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
ERS
MIKAOP
1973-2010 1973-1993 1994-2010
The Power of International Reserves : the Impossible trinity becomes possible  
 
21 
 
What should be mentioned is that if we take the whole sample from 1973 to 2010 (blue 
triangle), the result might be biased because the triangle will show that Lebanese Government 
is encouraging the Capital Openness, while by dividing the sample into 2 subsample, we had 
an opposite result where the triangle (gray triangle changes (almost 90°) from one side to 
other side to apply primarily a fixing exchange rate. The results of table 2 seem to be 
consistent of the broad outline of what happened in Lebanon, as mentioned earlier. 
As mentioned in previous study (Mansour 2012), the financial dollarization rate of 
Lebanon exceeds the 70%, therefore, the Lebanese monetary authority are facing difficulties 
to even think about floating exchange rate regime. As explained by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2001) and Braga et al (2001), the is a strong relation between the “fear of floating” and the 
level of dollarization rate. The highest the dollarization rate is,  the lowest is the degree of 
floating exchange rate regime, and the highest the “fear of floating” is expressend. This latter 
could be so acute that the exchange rate remains fixed long long time.   
 
4.1.2 The trilemma analysis of the Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
In the case of the group of countries sample, results and interpretations seem to be 
different. All coefficients are significant. As well as for the sum of contribution where they 
are all near two, above 1.8. Contributions indicates the variations of priority policies over 
years, is shows that Monetary Independence shared the highest weight all over the years from 
1973 to 2001 and from 2002, the highest weight of contribution was for the exchange rate 
stability. As for the Capital Openness, it shared the lowest weight all over years. We report 
our result in the following triangle of figure 4b below.  
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Figure 4b- The linear relation:  Mundell Triangle of Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
 
The figure shows clearer how the combinations of the trilemma policy choices are 
changing.  
Unlike the case of Lebanon where the policy mix was not possible, in this panel case, 
with years, according to different sub periods, we can notice that the shape of the triangle is 
changing to increase the degree of the ERS by decreasing the degree of the MI (triangle gray, 
then triangle yellow then the green one) and increasing the degree of KO.  
This case shows clearly the changes of the Trilemma indexes over years, 
geometrically, the triangle see to be equilateral which lead to confirm our conclusion that 
emerging countries are adopting simultaneously three objectives.  
Although these countries are dollarized and are expected to express the “fear of 
floating”, but these countries already challenged the fixed exchange rate regime in 90s and 
2000s, and already broke the barriers and float their exchange rate regime and suffered  long 
time from financial crisis do to their unsustainable policy. Nowadays, they are increasing IR 
in order to keep floating and keep opening financial market.  
Our results are consistent with the figure 2a of Aizenman (2008-2010). In fact, the 
global view from 1973 to 2010 in blue indicates that the main monetary policy is adopting the 
monetary independence and exchange rate stability, renouncing the capital openness. If we 
take every period, from 1973 to 1982, from 1983 to 1997 and from 1998 to 2001, we notice 
that unlike in Lebanon, those countries were adopting first the MI and then the ERS first 3 
subperiod and at last from 2002-2010, consistent with our result in table 2, countries were 
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adopting a managed flexible exchange rate regime where RS, MI and KAOP are sharing 
almost the same average contribution (0.6) 
 
5. From the trilemma to the quadrilemma 
As we have discussed above, accumulating IR may give facilities to policy maker to 
deal with the trade-off between MI, ERS and KAOP. This has been examined in the 
regression reported in table 3 and 4. We then report table results in the diamond graph below 
in order to see clearer the evolution of the policy decisions while introducing the IR 
Unlike previous study mainly done by Aizenman & al (2008), we repeat three times 
each calculations, by introducing the IR/GDP, then IR/ED and IR/STED in order to deduce if 
external debt can affect the IR in challenging the Mundell trilemma. 
Result concerned in one hand a single country Lebanon, and in other hand a group of 4 
countries 
*The quadrilemma of Lebanon 
According to table 3a to 3d, we can see that our coefficient are significant, except for 
the MI, like in the case of calculating the linearity in trilemma indexes above. But the result 
seems to fit well as long as R² are higher and the sum of contributions are close to 2 (above 
1.9). 
It is important to mention that when IR is significant, it has a negative sign, what mean 
that IR does not contribute to any change in the monetary decisions of the Lebanese authority 
concerning the challenge of impossible trinity. As for other indices, we conclude like previous 
conclusions with trilemma indexes, that before 1993, the main policy where to encourage the 
capital openness, while the policy becomes primarily maintaining the exchange rate stability 
after 1993, whether IR or not, and whatever is the IR ratio.  
The case of Lebanon is a perfect example to show that even if a country is accumulating 
a high level of IR like the case of Lebanon where the IR/GDP is one of the highest in the world 
(figure 4 in the Annex), if the policy maker does not allow the IR to intervene in challenging 
the Mundell Trilemma, the IR will have no effect on it. Whatever is the ratio of measurement 
of IR, whether it is over GDP or over ED or STED”. Table 3b-3c-3d in Appendix show that 
value of each goal is quite similar in all case from 1977-1393, indexes ERS and MI are around 
0 while KAOP is about 1.89. from 1994 to 2010, the MI and KAOP becomes around 0 while 
ERS becomes the main objective and about 1.8-1.9, and IR does not play effective role in degree 
of monetary policies, it is always around 0. Our results are reported below, in following figure 
5a to 5c. 
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Figure 5a- The Trilemma including the IR/GDP 
 
Figure 5b- The Trilemma including the IR/ED 
 
Figure 5c- The trilemma including the IR/STED 
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*The quadrilemma of Turkey, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
 
Unlike the previous case, the case of Lebanon, the IR in the case of Turkey, Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina seem to “act” like supposed theoretically, and to be involved in 
challenging the Mundell trilemma to have a new configuration that look like a diamond chart. 
In addition, interpretations may change depending on the IR ratio, whether it is on GDP or ED 
or STED. 
First, referring to results in table 4a to 4d of annexes, we realize that most of coefficients 
are significant, as well as the sum of contributions are all above 1.8, except for one case where 
the sum of contributions is equal to 1.4 although the adjusted R² =0.89. 
According to Means of indexes in table 4a, we can notice that the IR/STED increase 
remarkably while other are almost maintaining the same level. The contribution of IR/GDP 
were increasing all over the years from 0.37 to 1.17 in the last sub-sample date from 2002-2010, 
and other indexes are sharing the weight of about 0.2 to 0.4. 
As for the IR/Ed ratio in table 4d, we notice that the contribution is quite different than 
the IR/GDP. While the latter was sharing the highest weight of the indexes in the last 8 years, 
the IR/ED contribution was about 0.34. Note that previous year, the weighted average of the 
IR/ED was slowly similar to IR/GDP. Finally, in table 4c, we notice that the contribution of 
IR/STED as well as IR/ED were increasing over year till 2002 and after that, decreased sharply 
from 1.7 to 0.59 and from 1.34 to 0.34. Unlike the case of Lebanon, the intervention of IR as a 
policy tool, contribute clearly to change the trilemma configuration and change the degree of 
each policy: MI, ERS and KAOP. 
Figure 6a to 6c below show the difference between the combination of ERS, MI and 
KAOP in the presence of IR. The two last figures seem to be similar, so we conclude that the 
similarity of the effect of External debt, whether they are short term or not. In addition, we 
conclude that 1998-2001 countries were sharply increasing IR (IR/GDP or IR/ED or IR/STED), 
and that since 2002, the configuration of the diamond changed totally while introducing the 
IR/STED or IR/ED. 
We conclude that only when we consider the IR on external debt (figure 6b-6c), 
countries seem to achieve ERS, KAOP and MI, while, when considering the IR/GDP, countries 
seem adopt mainly the policy of hoarding IR, and not of achieving the 3 policy goals. 
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Figure 6a- The Trilemma including the IR/GDP 
 
 
Figure 6b- The Trilemma including the IR/ED 
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Figure 6c- The Trilemma including the IR/STED 
 
 
 
6. The Impact of external debt and short external debt on monetary and decisions. 
The trilemma policy configuration and its interaction can be examined with the level 
of IR on the outcome volatility as mentioned above.  Result of regressions are reported in 
Annexes, table 5a to 5c for the panel countries, and from table 6a to 6c for Lebanon. Each 
combination of two indices are reported in one column in addition of the interaction between 
one index and international reserve. Thus, each time we include IR whether it is over GDP or 
over ED or over STED, we repeat the regression 6 times (18 times for the panel and 18 times 
for Lebanon) in order to represent all possible combinations. Our results seem to be consistent 
and R² are above 0.66 and significant coefficient have sign consistent with our expectation: 
the sign of coefficients are negative while we have a negative relation with the output gap 
volatility, and they are positive when the variable contribute to an increase of the output 
volatility. Interpretation will consist in parallel table 5a-b-c with 6a –b-c in order to make a 
small comparison between emerging country group that are adopting a flexible exchange rate 
regime with monetary intervention (managed), while Lebanon applied de facto  a very strong 
fixed exchange rate regime. 
First evident remark that can be given is that coefficient of Lebanon are bigger than 
coefficient of the Panel, which confirm the vulnerability of the output volatility of Lebanon 
comparing to other countries. 
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Starting with control variables, such as the Relative Income (Per Capita GDP 
relatively to U.S), the coefficient of Lebanon is positively higher, knowing that the Lebanese 
relative income is lower, we conclude that the income is showing that the higher the lower 
income level, the higher output volatility is. The US real Interest rate is not significant in the 
Panel case. Like study of Cordahi and Goux (2007), the transmission of effect of US interest 
rate on Lebanon is not significant or very low. The positive sign indicates that it has a positive 
impact on the output volatility, because as cited above, it may represent a debt payment 
problem. 
Trade openness is not significant in the Panel, but it is on Lebanon, suggesting that, according 
to Rodrik (1998)12 and Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) the trade openness lead to increase 
the output volatility. Some economists such Krugman (1993) and Razin and Rose (1994) 
detailed the type of trade openness (intra-industry or inter-industry) in increasing output 
volatility13. 
The private credit creation is only reported in the Panel, not in Lebanon due to a lack 
of database. This variable that measures the financial development in the Panel is negatively 
significant and indicates that, consistent with Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Kose 
et al (2003), the developed financial market tend to reduce the output volatility. 
Concerning the trilemma indexes, in the case of the Panel, according to table 5a to 5c 
of Annexes, we can notice that ERS seems not to be significant (except for only 2 
regressions), meanwhile it is in the most of cases in Lebanon according to table 6a to 6c, thus, 
Exchange Rate Stability in Lebanon weaken the output volatility because of its negative sign, 
suggesting that country with strongest ERS will experience lower level of output volatility. 
ERS does not seem to be significant in the case of the Panel, but if it is coupled with the high 
International Reserves, ERS might have effect on the output volatility. Interaction term 
between ERS and IR (different ratio) have different results. Tables 5 and 6 show that 
interaction between the trilemma index and the IR is significant in the case of the Panel and in 
Lebanon (except while taking IR/ED for both Lebanon and Panel). It is important to mention 
that the sign is different in both cases: for the Panel, the sign is positive, showing that the 
interaction between the IR and the ERS increase the output volatility, while for Lebanon, the 
sign is negative it reduces the output volatility suggesting that countries holding International 
Reserves while maintaining a high ERS is able to reduce the output volatility which explain 
the trend of Lebanon to increase hoarding International Reserves.   
                                                          
12 In Aizenman (2009) 
13 idem 
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In the case of the Panel in table 5, we see that KAOP is significant and its negative 
sign indicates that the higher the capital openness is, that lower the output volatility, unlike 
the case of Lebanon, where table 6 indicates that the higher the capital openness is, the more 
vulnerable the output volatility due to its positive sign. But in all cases, while coupling the 
KAOP with IR/GDP or ED or STED, only the ration IR/ED and IR/STED are significant, 
indicating that IR/GDP might be weak as variable comparing to other 2 ratios while 
interacting with the KAOP. The coefficients on the interaction term between the KAOP and 
the IR/ED or IR/STED are significantly negative indicating that countries hording IR may 
express less output volatility. Our result seem to be more consistent that results of Aizenman 
(2009), where he found negative relation between the interaction of KAOP and the IR, 
treating it as “result somewhat counterintuitive”. 
Table 5 and table 6 in Annexes show that the Monetary Independence is positively 
significant, suggesting that, unlike the result of Aizenman  (2009), the greater the MI is, the 
higher the output volatility. If our results seem to be odd, it is consistent with result of Alesina 
and Summer (1993) who found that Independent Central Bank have no or little impact on 
output volatility. Concerning the interaction between the MI and the IR over GDP or ED or 
STED, only Lebanon seems to present coefficient negatively significant, suggesting that 
hoarding IR while interacting with MI reduces the output volatility, which lead to the 
understanding of the high trend of hording IR in Lebanon. 
Other institutional development variables are not included in our model but could have 
impact on the reducing or increasing the output volatility such as the LEGAL which is 
composed of Law and Order (LAO), anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT) and bureaucracy 
quality (BQ). 
 
7. Summary 
This paper discussed the importance of hoarding International reserves in decision of 
monetary authority over years for countries that are accumulating International Reserves and 
exceeding external debt (in foreign currencies) at the same time; such Lebanon (studied 
separately), Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey (panel). The study was divided into three 
steps.   
  We started first by measuring and drawing the trilemma indexes/triangle over years in 
order to see visually the trend of each policy. It was shown that the trilemma indexes of the 
panel was changing progressively over years in a way not to keep the MI of the head of 
policies, but to achieve all of the objectives without renouncing to anyone. In other way, the 
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decrease of MI was compensating by the increase of ERS, and the increase of KAOP and the 
triangle seem to be more equilateral than previous years: Thus, practicing the managed 
exchange rate regime. As for Lebanon, the trend changed from an extreme to another 
extreme: from achieving the KAOP as primary goal, to achieving the ERS, without any 
progressive change, which lead to confirm that the change was not due to a long term strategy 
or long term monetary policy, but due to a to an event, to a decision and brutal practice. Such 
result was expected as Lebanon is practicing (de facto) a total fixed exchange rate regime.  
  Second, we introduced the IR (IR/GDP, IR/ED and IR/STED) in order to see the 
impact of hoarding International Reserves on monetary decisions in the context of Mundell 
trilemma. We found obviously that taking the ratio IR/GDP gives totally different 
interpretation than IR/ED and/or IR/STED in the case of the Panel. The two latters give more 
sense and gives explanation that hoarding IR according to the level of ED or STED leads 
monetary authority to achieve the three goals, with more or less similar degree (little MI, little 
ERS and little KAOP) thus, we conclude that hoarding International Reserves becomes a 
mean for monetary authority to apply simultaneously the three goals of the Mundell 
Trilemma. The ration IR/GDP shows totally different interpretation; we notice that hoarding 
IR/GDP becomes no more a mean of achieving goals, but simply becomes the main goal and 
main objective by renouncing to the MI, ERS and KAOP. As for Lebanon, the IR level has no 
different effect whether it is measured over GDP or ED or STED. This makes our previous 
conclusions stronger, that hoarding IR is independent for monetary decisions toward the three 
policies of the Mundell triangle, in other terms, the IR in not included or does not play any 
economically role in terms of monetary policies, it could be explained only by that increasing 
IR could be an auto insurance against future probable crisis due to sudden stop, or flight of 
money of dollarization rate or other, but not a tool to change the Mundell Triangle. Lebanon 
could be an example of country where according to IMF14 (2011), reserves may be 
accumulated or held for non-precautionary reason, like due to exchange rate policy or for 
intergenerational. 
  Finally, by observing the Impact of different International Reserves ratio on Output 
Volatility and Interaction between IR ratio on GDP or ED or STED with trilemma indexes, 
we found that first of all, IR whether measured over GDP or ED or STED doesn’t necessarily 
have difference conclusion on the output volatility like it is while measuring the degree of 
each policy in the trilemma/quadrilemma. Consistent with Aizenman et al (2008) results, 
                                                          
14 IMF, 2011, assessing Reserve Adequacy 
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regressions show that, the higher the ERS and the IR a country follows, the more negative 
impact it can have on output volatility. The Interaction between IR and ERS have opposite 
impact on the output volatility, it increases the output volatility in the Panel and decreases in 
Lebanon thus, the highest level of ERS and IR, the more negative impact it can have on 
output volatility.  KAOP has opposite impact on the output volatility. Countries with more or 
less flexible exchange rate regime such the Panel, the KAOP decreases the output volatility, 
unlike Lebanon where KAOP increase the output volatility. In both cases, the KAOP coupling 
with the IR is significant only while taking the IR/ED or IR/STED, indicating that the 
IR/GDP is a weak variable to be considered with KAOP. I addition, the IR interacted with the 
KAOP lead to decrease the output volatility, thus IR is able to mitigate the output volatility. 
The MI indicates a positive impact on the output volatility for both cases. When coupling the 
MI with the IR, we remark that only in Lebanon we significant impact on the output volatility 
and opposite result, suggesting the importance of IR in reducing the output volatility.   
The Power of International Reserves : the Impossible trinity becomes possible  
 
32 
 
Conclusion 
Although empirical studies of Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) shows that intermediate 
solution is vulnerable to financial crisis, focused on the advantage and cost of every corner 
solution especially in emerging countries after 90s financial crisis, he concludes that a corner 
solution would not be preferable, but an intermediate regimes seem to be a better solution 
(Allegret 2007), especially for emerging countries where their structural characteristics are: 
debts, external debts (in foreign currencies), financial vulnerability; and low domestic 
institutional infrastructure (domestic governance approach (Allegret 2005)). In this paper we 
evaluate the impact of International Reserves ratio over GDP or ED or STED in two 
scenarios: the first one is assessing the IR on the monetary policy (ERS, MI, KAOP) of 
monetary authorities by studying the trend and changes patterns of the Trilemma 
configuration over years, and the second is evaluating its impact on the output volatility with 
monetary policy (ERS, MI, KAOP) as well. Our study is based on countries that are hoarding 
International Reserves and suffering from external debt (in foreign currency) such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey who adopted a (managed) flexible exchange rate 
regime, and Lebanon who “obliged” to adopted de facto a fixed exchange rate regime (corner 
solution) because of its high dollarization rate. We conclude first that IR participate in 
changing the patter of the Mundell Trilemma of emerging countries which lead to the 
“possible trinity” or a new configuration called Quadrilemma.  These countries accumulate 
high levels of IR in order to achieve certain level of exchange rate stability and financial 
openness together while maintaining high levels of monetary independence, and every goal 
has been achieved with an equal degree. It was tested that countries faced the trade-offs based 
on the trilemma and we confirmed that change in one of the trilemma variables would induce 
a change with the opposite sign in the weighted average of the other two. As for Lebanon, the 
IR does not participate to monetary decisions, that is, monetary authority does not include the 
IR to change the trend of achieving goals of the Mundell Trilemma. This latter is already 
decided and applied whether there is IR or not. That is, in the case of Lebanon, IR ratio 
measured on GDP or on debts do not change our result.  
Finally, we examined the impact of policy orientation which two out of three policies 
to choose, on output volatility and we found that taking IR/ED and STED is not or quite more 
significant than taking IR/GDP, and we conclude that coupling IR with trilemma indexes have 
impact on output volatility in all countries, although with opposite direction or interpretation. 
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Figure 1- Main role expected by Hoarding International Reserves 
Source: IMF survey of Reserve Manager 
 
Figure 2a - Trilemma Indexes of Brazil 
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Figure 2b- Trilemma Indexes of Mexico 
 
 
Figure 2c- Trilemma Indexes of Turkey 
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Figure 2d- Trilemma Indexes of Argentina 
 
 
Figure 2e- Trilemma Indexes of Lebanon 
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Figure 3a- The evolution of the Monetary Independence Index over years for the Panel 
 
Figure 3b- The evolution of Capital Openness Index over years for the aPanel 
 
Figure 3c- The evolution of Exchange Rate Stability Index over years for the Panel 
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Figure 4a- The Level of International Reserves Lebanon 
 
 
 
Figure 4b- The Level of International Reserves in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey 
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Table 1- Calculation of the Trilemma Indexes of Lebanon from 1973-2010. 
Mean  
 1973-2010 1973-1993 1994-2010 
ERS 0.56685 0.22359 0.9908 
MI 0.458048 0.430683 0.4918 
KAOPEN 0.896764 1 0.7692 
Coefficient 
ERS 0.655188*** -0.0631*** 1.8495*** 
MI -0.31831 0.0214 0.0525 
KO 1.9176*** 1.9555*** 0.1513* 
Observations 38 21 17 
Adjusted R Squared 0.45 0.46 0.42 
Notes: ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0.1 
 
Trilemma 
Contributions 
 1973-2010 1973-1993 1994-2010 
ERS 0.371393 -0.01411 1.832625 
MI -0.1458 0.009217 0.0258 
KO 1.7196 1.955 0.1163 
Sum of 
Contributions 
∑ 1.94522 1.9506 1.9748 
 
Table 2: Calculation of the Trilemma Indexes of Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico from 1973-
2010 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
Means ERS 0.42112 0.5479 0.4070 0.482311 0.2765 
MI 0.4744 0.4313 0.4768 0.593134 0.4570 
KO 0.32396 0.3037 0.2577 0.4172 0.4152 
coefficients ERS 1.1471*** 1.07*** 0.974*** 1.2238*** 2.3786 *** 
MI 2.3707*** 2.4846*** 2.698*** 1.8834*** 1.34810*** 
KO 0.65505*** 0.455* 0.416* 0.6589* 1.4411 
Observations  113 29 60 12 37 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
 0.36 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.15 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
Trilemma 
Contributions 
ERS 0.483071 0.586264 0.396422 0.589867 0.63489 
MI 1.12466 1.071837 1.286414 1.117108 0.613737 
KO 0.212211 0.138375 0.107319 0.274944 0.58765 
Sum of 
Contributions 
∑ 1.819943 1.8 1.79015 1.9819 1.83627 
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Table 3-  Calculating the Quadrilemma Indexes of Lebanon from 1977-2010 
 
Table 3a- Means of ERS-MI-KO-IR/GDP, IR/STED and IR/ED  
  1977-2010 1977-1993 1994-2010 
Means ERS 0.59973 0.208585 0.9908 
MI 0.45866 0.425472 0.4918 
KO 0.884618 1 0.7692 
IR_GDP 0.452129 0.3973 0.5068 
IR_STED 6.9878 9.9349 4.0407 
IR_ED 4.8694 8.3607 1.3781 
 
 
Table 3b- With IR/GDP  
coefficients ERS 0.586123*** -0.0255* 1.822659*** 
MI -0.261388 -0.0066 0.089509 
KO 1.84006*** 1.9656*** 0.1373* 
IR_GDP 0.2738* -0.025* 0.02565 
Observations  34 17 17 
Adjusted R²  0.5 0.31 0.55 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
 
 
  1977-2010 1977-1993 1994-2010 
Contributions ERS 0.35151 -0.005 1.8060 
MI -0.11988 -0.0028 0.044 
KO 1.62775 1.9656 0.1056 
IR_GDP 0.12379 -0.009993 0.0130 
Sum of 
Contributions 
 1.9831 1.9475 1.9686 
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Table 3c - With IR_ED 
coefficients ERS 0.6479*** -0.008 1.97114*** 
MI -0.3480 0.0110 0.0465 
KO 1.9549*** 1.9501*** -0.08132 
IR_ED -0.00357 -0.0006* 0.04*** 
Observations  34 17 17 
Adjusted R²  0.68 0.37 0.31 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
 
  1977-2010 1977-1993 1994-2010 
Contributions ERS 0.3885 -0.00172 1.9531 
MI -0.1596 0.00468 0.02287 
KO 1.7294 1.9501 -0.0625 
IR_ED -0.02494 -0.00501 0.0551 
Sum of 
Contributions 
 1.9333 1.9480 1.9686 
 
 
Table 3.d- With IR_STED  
coefficients ERS 0.668*** -0.0251 1.8333*** 
MI -0.3889 0.01132 0.0875 
KO 1.9448*** 1.949947*** 0.13455* 
IR_STED -0.0002 -0.000205* 0.001378 
Observations  34 17 17 
Adjusted R²  0.6 0.59 0.57 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
 
 
  1977-2010 1977-1993 1994-2010 
Contributions ERS 0.40061 -0.00524 1.8165 
MI -0.1783 0.00481 0.0430 
KO 1.7204 1.94994 0.1035 
IR_STED -0.00139 -0.00203 0.005568 
Sum of 
Contributions 
 1.9412 1.9474 1.9686 
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Table 4- Calculation of the Quadrilemma Indexes of Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico from 
1973-2010 
  
Table 4a- Means of ERS-MI-KO-IR/GDP, IR/STED and IR/ED 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
Means ERS 0.421124 0.54791 0.407004 0.482311 0.276589 
MI 0.4744 0.431392 0.476803 0.593134 0.457049 
KO 0.323962 0.303721 0.257793 0.417277 0.415259 
IR_GDP 0.057906 0.03272 0.057906 0.069923 0.108245 
IR_STED 1.194586 0.808318 1.194586 1.222992 2.402823 
IR_ED 0.233791 0.18975 0.233971 0.227328 0.440466 
 
 
Table 4b- With IR/GDP 
 
 
   
  
coefficients ERS 1.14*** 0.939665*** 0.699067*** 0.50877* 1.3748*** 
MI 1.8694*** 2.10311*** 2.335116*** 0.82324*** 0.63668** 
KO 0.29967* 0.467496** 0.403433 0.54035** 0.36714* 
IR_GDP 6.5545*** 10.76634*** 7.26811*** 15.6892*** 10.888*** 
Observations  113 29 60 12 27 
Adjusted R²  0.4 0.7 0.36 0.87 0.17 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
Contributions ERS 0.480081 0.514852 0.284523 0.245385 0.380255 
MI 0.886843 1.907265 1.11339 0.488292 0.290994 
KO 0.097082 0.141989 0.104002 0.225476 0.152458 
IR_GDP 0.379584 0.352276 0.420853 1.097029 1.178569 
Sum of 
Contributions 
 1.843554 1.916382 1.922768 2.05 2.002 
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Table 4c - With IR_STED 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
coefficients ERS 1.55825*** 0.94152*** 0.4005 -0.3607 3.392383*** 
MI 2.0444*** 2.0218*** 2.154256*** 1.2411*** 1.5448*** 
KO 0.2167 0.57926* 0.74054** -1.94276* -0.7679 
IR_STED 0.2408*** 0.4491 0.617956*** 1.39029*** 0.24802** 
Observations  132 24 60 16 32 
Adjusted R²  0.41 0.67 0.32 0.89 0.37 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
Contributions ERS 0.656217 0.515869 0.163005 -0.17397 0.938296 
MI 0.969863 0.872189 1.027155 0.736138 0.706049 
KO 0.070203 0.175934 0.190906 -0.81067 0.31888 
IR_STED 0.287656 0.363016 0.738202 1.700313 0.595948 
Sum of 
Contributions 
 1.983 1.927 2.11 1.451 1.921 
 
 
Table 4d- With IR_ED 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
coefficients ERS 1.10402*** 1.018323*** 0.524*** -0.1129 2.982527*** 
MI 2.08617* 2.233267*** 2.404*** 1.05861*** 1.447575*** 
KO 0.34494*** 0.503244* 0.490 -0.3693 0.106162 
IR_ED 1.0627*** 0.2807 0.172*** 5.92293*** 0.78664*** 
Observations  132 24 60 16 32 
Adjusted R²  0.4 0.62 0.31 0.69 0.32 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0,01 ; **p<0,05 ; *p<0,1 
 
 
  1973-2010 1973-1982 1983-1997 1998-2001 2002-2010 
Contributions ERS 0.464929 0.55795 0.21327 -0.05445 0.824935 
MI 0.989679 0.963414 1.146544 0.6278 0.661613 
KO 0.111747 0.152846 0.126546 -0.1541 0.044085 
IR_ED 0.248641 0.155728 0.508281 1.3464 0.346488 
Sum of 
Contributions 
 1.814 1.829 1.99 1.765 1.877 
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Table 5-  The Ourtput Volatility Regression 
Table 5a- The Regression with IR/GDP 
 
 
Notes:  robust standard error ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relative 
income 
0.212*** 0.201*** 0.186*** 0.166*** 0.171*** 0.162*** 
Trade 
Openness vol 
0.141*** 0.138*** 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 
Inflation 
Rate 
0.0000041
0** 
0.00000543
** 
0.0000003 0.000004* 0.0000037
2* 
0.0000037
8* 
M2 growth 
vol 
-
0.0000204
*** 
0.00000398
*** 
-0.0000007 -
0.0000036 
-
0.0000073
4 
0.0000017
4 
Relative oil 
price 
-0.0000506 -0.0000208 0.0000522 0.0000389 0.0000353 0.0000338 
Total 
reserve/GDP 
-0.011 0.055 0.002 0.167*** 0.088 0.174*** 
US interest 
rate 
-0.004601* -0.0036 0.001981 0.000765 -0.0083 -0.000835 
World 
Output Gap 
-
0.031125*
** 
-0.032*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
Inflation Vol 0.0000177
*** 
0.0000134*
** 
0.0000165
*** 
0.0000120
** 
0.0000127
*** 
0.0000123
*** 
DCTPS -0.0002 0.00251 -0.00013 -0.000162 -0.00194 -0.00183 
       
MI 0.015*** 0.0088   0.010 0.017*** 
ERS -0.024* -0.0011 -0.021** 0.002258   
KAOP   -0.020*** -0.16** -0.20*** -0.013* 
MI*Reserve  0.141   0.108  
KAOP*Reser
ves 
   -0.094  -0.123 
ERS*Reserve
s 
0.434**  0.439***    
observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Adjusted R² 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70 
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Table 5b-The Regression with IR/ED 
 
Notes: robust standard error ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Relative 
income 
0.197*** 0.194*** 0.174*** 0.161*** 0.17*** 0.1556*** 
Trade 
Openness vol 
0.167*** 0.167*** 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.143*** 
Inflation Rate 0.00000470
** 
0.00000468
** 
0.0000042
6* 
0.000004
60 
0.0000028
8 
0.0000040
3 
M2 growth vol 0.00000145 0.00000330 -
0.0000038
3 
-
0.000005
36 
-0.0000882 -0.0000543 
Relative oil 
price 
-
0.00000938 
0.0000106 0.0000399 0.000038
3 
0.0000634 0.0000298 
Total 
reserve/ED 
-0.005 0.013 0.0018 0.0397** 0.0210 0.0461** 
US interest 
rate 
-0.0039 -0.003316 -
0.001344*
* 
-0.00152 -0.00566 -0.001678 
World Output 
Gap 
-0.032*** -0.032*** -
0.030487*
** 
-
0.03124*
** 
-
0.033121*
** 
-0.0342*** 
Inflation Vol 0.0000130*
** 
0.0000131*
** 
0.0000111 0.000010
4* 
0.0000120
** 
0.0000108
** 
DCTPS -
0.000215** 
-
0.000233** 
-0.000151 -0.000147 -0.00192* -0.000164 
       
MI 0.017*** 0.023***   0.0222** 0.0199*** 
ERS -0.005 0.00739 -0.0023 0.00315   
KAOP   -0.0224*** -0.0112* -0.0207*** -0.0065 
MI*Reserve  -0.019   -0.02001  
KAOP*Reser
ves 
   -0.268*  -0.0801** 
ERS*Reserves 0.034  0.0383    
observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Adjusted R² 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 
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Table 5c- Regression with IR/STED 
 
Notes:  robust standard error ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
  
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Relative 
income 
0.195*** 0.1947*** 0.176*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 
Trade 
Openness vol 
0.160*** 0.167*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.155*** 0.147*** 
Inflation Rate 0.00000536
** 
0.00000467
** 
0.0000045
8 
0.00000452 0.0000025
9 
0.0000041 
M2 growth 
vol 
-
0.00000323 
0.00000375 -
0.0000037
4 
-
0.00000571 
0.0000034
8 
-0.0000053 
Relative oil 
price 
-0.000023 0.0000161 0.000035 0.0000414 0.0000799 0.0000332 
Total 
reserve/STED 
-0.00437** 0.004019 -0.002328 0.0114*** 0.00582 0.01208*** 
US interest 
rate 
-0.004648* -0.002784 -0.001869 -0.0000199 0.00425 -0.0000566 
World 
Output Gap 
-0.0291*** -0.0318*** -
0.028398*
** 
-
0.03135*** 
-
0.032374*
** 
-
0.034397**
* 
Inflation Vol 0.0000099 0.00001.29
** 
0.0000088
2* 
0.0000129*
** 
0.0000120
** 
0.0000136*
** 
DCTPS -0.000179* -
0.000233** 
-0.00125 -0.00119 -
0.000182* 
-0.000136 
       
MI 0.016*** 0.0268***   0.02838** 0.01966*** 
ERS -0.01449 0.000704 -0.00841 0.002037   
KAOP   -
0.019336*
** 
-0.00203 -
0.02047**
* 
-0.00214 
MI*Reserve 0.0165* -0.00633   -0.008162  
KAOP*Reser
ves 
   -0.0187***  -
0.02066*** 
ERS*Reserve
s 
0.0184**  0.01521**    
observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Adjusted R² 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.71 
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Table 6a- The Regression of Lebanon with IR/GDP 
 
Notes:  robust standard error ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0.1 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relative income 1.221* -0.4125 1.0665* -0.2893 -0.1829 0.8868 
Trade Openness 
vol 
0.156** 0.08 0.0273 0.1224* 0.2248**
* 
0.1722** 
Inflation Rate 0.000223 0.000125 0.000095
6 
0.0000514 0.000004
7 
0.0000087 
M2 growth vol -0.2232*** -0.1474** -
0.1496**
* 
-0.1248** -0.1457** -0.1610** 
Relative oil 
price 
-0.0013 0.000394 -0.000109 0.0000083 -
0.001795
* 
-0.0017* 
Total 
reserve/GDP 
0.253* 1.0248*** 0.1658 0.4678 -0.1894 -0.7712 
US interest rate -0.0218 -0.000657 -0.018023 -0.01287 -0.0545 -0.0527 
World Output 
Gap 
0.1268*** 0.1094*** 0.1036**
* 
0.112032**
* 
0.1172**
* 
0.1056*** 
Inflation Vol 0.000728*
* 
0.000130 0.000516
* 
-0.00000802 0.00291 0.000523 
       
MI 0.1962 0.8793***   -0.386 +0.3075*
* 
ERS 0.0152 -0.3325*** -0.0374 -0.2578***   
KAOP   0.2640**
* 
0.3363*** 0.3304** 0.2740** 
MI*Reserve  -
2.24702**
* 
  0.0502  
KAOP*Reserve
s 
   -0.50703  0.6326 
ERS*Reserves -0.7505***  -0.5833**    
observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adjusted R² 0.75 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.73 
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Table 6b-The Regression of Lebanon with IR/ED 
Notes :  robust standard error ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Relative 
income 
-0.2601 -0.142 -0.0111 -0.2755 -0.7621** -0.6874 
Trade 
Openness vol 
0.2555*** 0.1096* 0.1180** 0.1314*** 0.1387** 0.1934*** 
Inflation Rate 0.000267* 0.000272**
* 
0.0000899 0.00127 0.000141 0.0000097
9 
M2 growth vol 0.1413*** -0.0784* -
0.10012**
* 
-
0.1083*** 
-0.0589 -0.0917** 
Relative oil 
price 
0.00941 0.000288 0.001 0.000884 -
0.0000763 
0.0000992 
Total 
reserve/ED 
0.02359**
* 
0.0742*** 0.0144*** 0.4579*** 0.0578*** 0.0236 
US interest rate 0.0421 0.0355** 0.0366* 0.0287* 0.0325 0.0249 
World Output 
Gap 
0.0469* -0.0135 0.0432** 0.0577*** -0.0105 0.0348 
Inflation Vol 0.000314 0.00637*** 0.000210 0.000130 0.000591*
* 
0.000364* 
       
MI 0.0481 0.2441**   -0.1017 0.3445*** 
ERS -0.0712 -0.1204*** -
0.1503*** 
-
0.2526*** 
  
KAOP   0.2057*** 0.2469*** 0.1257 0.2429*** 
MI*Reserve  -0.1309***   -0.0961**  
KAOP*Reserve
s 
   -
0.45003**
* 
 -0.0138 
ERS*Reserves -0.0338  -0.0159    
observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adjusted R² 0.82 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.85 
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Table 6c- Regression of Lebanon with IR/STED 
Notes :  robust standard error ***p<0.01  **p<.05  *p<0.1 
 
 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Relative 
income 
0.0119 -0.6496 0.010039 -0.8615 -1.0779 0.0271 
Trade 
Openness vol 
0.1750*** -0.0366 -0.0099 0.098036 0.1777** 0.1279* 
Inflation Rate 0.000175 0.0000931 0.0000184 0.000111 -
0.0000038
8 
-0.00000672 
M2 growth vol -
0.1697*** 
-0.0906** -0.0929** -
0.096037*
* 
-
0.100344* 
-0.1117** 
Relative oil 
price 
0.000936 0.001453** 0.0011* 0.000891 -0.000443 -0.000368 
Total 
reserve/STED 
0.0441** 0.1421*** 0.0462*** 0.1412** 0.023001 -0.0754 
US interest 
rate 
0.0402 0.0523** 0.0471** 0.0314 0.0131 0.0121 
World Output 
Gap 
0.0527* -0.0109 0.0338 0.0616** 0.0484 0.0402 
Inflation Vol 0.000802*
* 
0.000834**
* 
0.000657*
* 
0.000174 0.000593 0.000735** 
       
MI 0.1572 0.8210***   +0.3738* +0.340006**
* 
ERS -0.0587 -0.3239*** -0.0436 -
0.2927*** 
  
KAOP   0.2785*** 0.3097*** 0.2706** 0.2489** 
MI*Reserve  -0.2523***   -0.0106  
KAOP*Reserv
es 
   -0.1238*  0.0928 
ERS*Reserves -0.0609*  -0.0765**    
observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adjusted R² 0.77 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.77 
